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
AIR CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

AIR WAR COLLEGE  
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AIR CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

by

Donald L. McSwain  
Colonel, USAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM  
REQUIREMENT

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1989

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Air Campaign Planning for Contingency Operations

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Provides insights into the correlation of national strategy to air force capabilities in contingency operations short of declared war.

Highlights evolutionary changes in national policy with regard to employing military forces to cope with "peacetime" contingency operations. Identifies key roles played by air forces in conducting contingency operations, be they single service or joint activities.

Describes major challenges and planning considerations entailed in crisis assessment, task force organization, force tailoring, and development of cohesive operating concepts--to lay the foundation for a successful air campaign.

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#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Donald L. McSwain (M.B.A., University of California, Los Angeles) held key positions in war and mobilization planning, long-range planning, and doctrine divisions under Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations on the Air Staff. He has flown in security assistance surges, disaster relief, and numerous joint exercises evaluating air force rapid power projection capabilities. He has provided support for military training missions and military assistance groups throughout Southwest Asia. He has extensive experience in strategic and theater airlift support to U.S. military operations throughout Europe, Asia, and Central America. A graduate of Air Command and Staff College, he completed a major regional study comparing Soviet and United States capabilities to respond to crises in Southern Africa. Colonel McSwain is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1989.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, the U.S. has accepted a major role as leader of the free world. Three of its stated national security objectives include:

To safeguard the United States, its allies, and **interests** by **deterring** aggression and coercion; and should deterrence fail, by **defeating** the armed aggression and **ending** the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its allies, and **interests** at the **lowest possible level of hostilities**.

To encourage and **assist** our allies and **friends** in defending themselves against aggression, coercion, subversion, insurgencies, and terrorism.

To ensure U.S. **access** to critical resources, markets, the oceans, and space.<sup>1</sup>

The bold print has been added to emphasize U.S. objectives that require warfighting capabilities to deter or defeat armed aggression threatening our friends or our accessibility to other regions of the world that are crucial to free trade and economic growth. The requirement to conclude a conflict at the lowest level of hostilities further implies that the U.S. will employ the minimum level of force consistent with the threat and the nature of the U.S. interest being confronted.

This most recent statement of U.S. security goals stems from numerous refinements of U.S. national strategy since the Truman Doctrine, which called for containment of communism, and the Eisenhower strategy, which called for massive retaliation to deal with adversaries that challenged U.S. interests. Its subsequent failure and the alteration of national strategy to provide for a flexible response to crises led to the

evolution of the contemporary military roles--safeguarding the United States and its allies by deterring and defeating armed aggression, for which military doctrine, training, and warfighting capabilities have been specifically designed in order to achieve U.S. objectives at every level of the conflict spectrum.

When confronted with hostilities toward the U.S. or governments with which it had formal treaty commitments, the U.S. achieved tremendous success in deterring its adversaries across this conflict spectrum in the post World War II era. It established elaborate unified and specified command organizations and prepared deliberate war plans for joint and combined warfighting. AirLand Battle Doctrine and the Maritime Strategy were founded on employment of large military forces in a highly stylized method of maneuver and firepower designed to overcome a large conventional attack and rapidly force the aggressor to a culminating point which is favorable to the U.S. or its allies. Conventional air forces have also generally been configured to support these large naval and land campaigns envisioned by surface combatants and were well suited to win the wars which the U.S. could not afford to lose.

Recent U.S. history, however, is replete with examples of localized conflict threatening U.S. interests or friendly nations, in which U.S. forces were called to action, short of declared war, and were improperly employed or failed to measure up to expectations. In almost every case, airpower proved to be the crucial element in providing closeup observation of the region, rapidly projecting forces, conducting military operations, and concluding U.S. military presence. In these contingency operations, effective use of air forces required greater

latitude and innovation in developing employment concepts that take full advantage of their speed, range, and inherent flexibility.

This paper will focus on planning and conducting contingency operations which employ air forces to achieve quick military responses, short of declared war. Since such actions are taken without full mobilization or domestic support implied with declared war and often without clearly defined international responsibilities inherent with treaty commitments, a chapter of this paper will highlight the importance of fully understanding past, present, and likely future political contexts requiring the use of military forces to achieve national policy goals. The remainder of this paper will provide a closer look at the specific role of air forces, and how they might best be employed in a contingency. Finally, while this paper will concentrate on air campaign planning, it is important to recognize that most contingencies do require air forces to be employed jointly with land or maritime forces. Therefore, it is fully intended that the air campaign plan envisioned by this paper would be fully integrated within the scope of operational concepts and strategies established by joint task force commander.

## CHAPTER II

### NATIONAL STRATEGY

A coherent national strategy is the first and foremost requirement for developing successful plans, programs, and organizations for effective use of military forces in a contingency response. U.S. national strategy must be broad enough to ensure all instruments of national power are considered and are appropriately integrated in response to challenges to U.S. interests. The selected strategy should remain flexible enough to deal with current reality while providing a vision of long-term U.S. goals. It must provide a general policy framework for coping with a wide range of potential threats to U.S. interests within the major regions of the world, while taking full advantage of opportunities to shape those events for achievement of longer range U.S. objectives.

#### Historical Precedents

Historically, U.S. presidents have used broad national strategy statements referred to as "doctrines" to communicate U.S. national interests in both global and regional power relationships. In the past, most of these doctrines have been expressed in terms of East-West relationships which viewed world politics as a zero-sum game where important spheres of influence were established and vociferously protected through alliances or unilateral actions. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, established U.S. resolve to keep foreign (predominately European) powers from further colonial intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, the Truman Doctrine was established in the belief

that it was in the U.S. interests to help any free people who were threatened by communist subjugation. The Nixon-Guam Doctrine stemmed from U.S. recognition that there were limits on its capability to directly support all anti-communist struggles around the globe, but that the U.S. would honor its treaty commitments and only provide indirect support in other situations. The 1979 Carter Doctrine further established the concept that, in certain economically important areas such as oil-rich Southwest Asia, the U.S. would consider external attacks to the region contrary to vital U.S. interests. This provided the impetus for strengthening the capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force which was later to be established as U.S. Central Command. More recently, the Reagan Doctrine has expanded U.S. indirect support to include assistance to insurgents fighting to overthrow established communist governments (e.g., Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan).

Each of these presidential doctrines formed the basis for more specific U.S. policy decisions during their own administrations and have established historical precedents for current policy-making. A brief review of past challenges to U.S. interests leading to military involvement in contingency operations underscores the need for clearly stated U.S. national strategies.

#### Direct Challenges to U.S. Interests

State-planned violence or threats of violence against U.S. citizens, its economic interests, or military forces protecting its interests have historically presented the predominant challenges in this category. Libyan-sponsored terrorist activities directed toward U.S. citizens and concern for the safety of U.S. citizens in Grenada, which

lead up to "El Dorado Canyon" and the "Urgent Fury" operations, are two more recent examples of confrontations which have required military responses. However, not all direct confrontations lead to decisive military action. The North Korean capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo during the Johnson administration and the shootdown of a Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan during the Nixon Administration resulted in little or no military response and were judged to be general failures for U.S. policy. In both these later two cases, the U.S. failed largely due to lack of central direction and unity of purpose.<sup>1</sup> Measured military responses proved difficult to plan and execute without clear cut policy objectives that were fully understood by key decision-makers **before the crises developed.** Further, inability to generate useful military options from existing military capabilities presented national decision-makers with dilemmas on how to demonstrate resolve while reducing the likelihood of future direct confrontations.

#### Indirect Challenges

Global containment of communism is a policy goal that places the U.S. in opposition to all communist-inspired insurgencies as well as communist-controlled governments. The mere fact that a government's leadership was avowed anti-communist had made their country worthy of U.S. support. Security alliances as well as implied commitments have also provided potential for indirect challenges to U.S. interests. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War is a prime example of a U.S. contingency response in support of a government with which no formal treaty existed, but in which the U.S. elected to undergo a massive airlift of weaponry that virtually turned the tide of the war. Special relationships with

friendly nations will likely continue to command U.S. military responses due to our unique technical capabilities or self-assumed global leadership role. U.S. support for the U.K. in the Falklands War is a prime example of a scenario where even U.S. hemispheric treaty relationships were not necessarily the prime concern in developing contingency responses.

Finally, domestic ethnic constituencies can influence the U.S. response to international events. The U.S. approach to finding regional solutions to conflicts within Southern Africa has clearly become less influenced by traditional concerns over containment of communism and more concerned with ending racial discrimination. Therefore, it is important to recognize that domestic constituencies can play a major role in determining both the means and the methodology used to respond to an international crisis.

#### Natural Challenges

These are contingencies which result from other than man-made events. Virtually every year natural disasters create situations requiring external assistance in which the U.S. is likely to respond. This is not only due to our relative wealth and assumed leadership role but also largely due to the unique technical capabilities of our military equipment and the speed with which it can be employed. Additionally, disaster relief is generally not confrontational to other nation's interests and can lead to closer ties to sponsored nations or strengthen internal support for a government in power. On the other hand, it is by no means automatic as Nicaragua learned in the aftermath of one of the worst hurricanes to hit Central America in this century.

### Reagan Strategy

A comparison of President Reagan's 1987 White House paper, National Security Strategy of the United States, with the 1988 version indicates a subtle shift in the role of the military in contingency operations short of declared war. The 1987 White House paper defined the role of the military instrument of national power to be:

. . . indirect--rather than direct--applications of U.S. military power are the most appropriate and cost effective way to achieve national goals. . . . The primary role for U.S. armed forces in Low Intensity Conflict is to support and facilitate the security assistance program. The military services must also stand ready to provide more direct forms of military assistance when called upon. . . . U.S. combat forces will be introduced into Low Intensity Conflict only as a last resort and when vital national security interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected.<sup>2</sup>

While the 1988 White House paper reiterated ". . . the most appropriate application of U.S. military power is usually indirect through security assistance--training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment," it clearly signaled possible use of military forces in other than last resort, vital scenarios:

Our strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict recognize that U.S. responses in such situations must be realistic, often discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict's outcome and important U.S. national security interests. . . . When a U.S. response is called for, we take care to ensure it is developed in accordance with the principles of international and domestic law, which affirm the inherent right of states to use force in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack; and to assist one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency, terrorism, illicit narcotics traffic, and other characteristic forms of low intensity conflict.<sup>3</sup>

President Reagan's recent willingness to openly refer to contingency plans under development for an attack of a Libyan chemical weapons plant further reinforces the likelihood that the rewrite of the 1988 White

House paper on national strategy was intended and not simply the result of National Security Staff wordsmithing.

Bush Strategy

"Will this strategy shift continue into the Bush Administration?" is an even more relevant question in this time of transition. The Bush Administration will be charged with writing a major portion of the last chapter of U.S. 20th Century foreign policy. President Bush has assembled a large number of experienced technocrats and he personally brings more international political experience to the task than most of his predecessors. However, the environment of the 1990's may bear little similarity to the past as world power relationships evolve. Largely as a result of Secretary Gorbachev's initiatives, East-West confrontations are on the decline. If the Soviets do limit their direct support for communist insurgencies while they attempt to resolve their serious domestic economic problems, Third World regional power relationships could shift in favor of the West. These realignments can provide opportunities for a greater direct U.S. role. However, despite greater harmony between East and West, U.S. interests are bound to be threatened by corrupt governments involved in international drug trafficking or by international turmoil resulting from foreign export of sophisticated weaponry to Third World countries embroiled in internal power struggles. Instability associated with such leaders as Noriega in Panama and Khadafi in Libya can be expected to spread to other regions and could require some direct U.S. military action. Also, interdiction of illegal drugs under the new Drug Enforcement Act already involves the use of high technology military capabilities to detect and, in some cases, eliminate

foreign sources and means of transportation. Further, the general availability of high technology weapons, such as plastic explosives, has already significantly increased the threat to U.S. citizens posed by state-sponsored terrorism.

With the reduced likelihood of escalation when directly confronting Soviet or Chinese client states, the U.S. may find it less dangerous to commit forces for policy enforcement. On the other hand, President Bush must continue to cope with increasingly competitive North-South relations under the constraints of the War Powers Resolution which severely limits the use of overt military force for extended operations. This restriction places a premium on rapid reacting military operations which can successfully achieve very limited objectives. As a result, military forces will need specific tailoring to ensure they quickly send the right signal or demonstrate appropriate national resolve, while the U.S. must rely on covert activities or non-military instruments of power to achieve longer term objectives. Whatever strategy is chosen, military imperatives for effectively dealing with the current, increasingly dynamic world political environment must include a clear understanding of U.S. vital interests and a cohesive plan for integrating all available national policy instruments.

## CHAPTER III

### AIR FORCE ROLE IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

"Our military forces have demonstrated capabilities to engage in low intensity conflict, and these capabilities have improved substantially in the last several years. . ." were the comments of President Reagan in his 1988 National Security Strategy White House paper. He also stated, "The capability of air forces to deploy rapidly in crises adds to our ability to bring effective military power to bear in distant regions in contingencies."<sup>1</sup> What are some of the key characteristics air forces should provide to the National Command Authorities (NCA) in contingency operations? The following characteristics highlight key attributes which should be considered when developing doctrine, force structure, and training programs to fulfill a national strategy requiring the use of air forces in contingency operations:

- Responsive
- Flexible
- Mobile
- Appropriate
- Sustainable
- Controllable
- Conclusive

#### Responsive

Speed and range are basic characteristics desirable in virtually all air forces.<sup>2</sup> These are the primary characteristics that allow air forces to be more responsive than surface forces. U.S. forces are forward deployed to numerous regions of the Eurasian landmass and, as a global maritime power, must provide a level of presence that generally

deters hostile activities. Once a response is required of U.S. military forces, air forces have the unique ability to react quickly and provide immediate presence to signal resolve or eliminate the threat to U.S. interests. With this in mind, all military equipment developed for naval and land warfare should also incorporate air transportability in its design. Furthermore, military doctrine and training should include operating concepts for use of newly developed equipment in contingencies.

AirLand Battle Doctrine and our Joint Operational Planning System is oriented almost exclusively toward mid- and high-intensity conventional operations. Both our doctrine and operational planning generally presume a phased buildup with military mobilization consistent with a national consensus that war is necessary. Contingency operations, on the other hand, deny the military the luxury of assured popular support and the normal planning time expected for large conventional operations. In fact, unit type codes and force modules developed for the current family of war plans are likely unsuitable for the size of force package desired in most contingency operations. Aerial delivery of surface forces, for example, can place very real constraints on the size and composition of those forces. Air transportability, then, becomes a primary limiting factor on the joint force commander's concept of operations.

Even though air forces are designed for rapid deployment, their ability to be effectively employed in sustained operations frequently depends upon the availability of fixed air bases. An air commander cannot presume access to foreign air bases--including those which are used routinely under existing treaties with other nations. For example,

use of NATO air bases is predicated on external threats to one or more of the sixteen member nations. Contingency operations rarely threaten other member nations directly, thereby requiring direct consultation with individual nations to provide for use of air bases within their respective countries. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War is a prime example of a situation in which air transportation was crucial to the outcome, and the only enroute air base made available to the U.S. was Lajes Airfield in the Portuguese Azores. Unrestricted access to air bases can be negotiated but has proven very costly, and Congress has been willing to pay for such bases only when they are crucial to our national defense strategy (e.g., Philippines).

Overflight of other nations is also frequently required to reach an objective and is another very real limitation placed on a commander's operational concept. In the 1986 "El Dorado Canyon" contingency bombing of Libya, the U.S. was not given permission to overfly France or Spain, requiring a 14-hour, round-trip mission to keep the attacking forces within international airspace and requiring them to operate in "due regard" to other possible conflicting traffic flying along civil airways. The resulting requirement to launch additional spare aircraft and tankers greatly complicated planning and reduced the probability that strike aircraft would achieve complete surprise over the highly defended objective area. This type of constraint can also limit the axis of an attack and escape route; and, for some inland nations, it can eliminate accessibility altogether unless adjacent nations grant permission for overflight. Of course, national airspace sovereignty can be ignored, but

not without significant cost to future U.S. relations with many nations which have already granted access for non-belligerent activities.

The ability to rapidly launch a combat force from within the U.S. and to complete a mission anywhere in the world with acceptable probability of success is highly desirable. In this regard, only the U.S. has developed a significant capability to conduct such operations on a global basis. The very existence of this capability has also increased the likelihood of its use in providing support for United Nations or allied nations' security operations as well as disaster relief activities. Requirements, such as the airlift of a 50-member U.N. contingency planning group from New York to Windhoek, Namibia and return, are typical of the type of contingency air support requested almost yearly from the U.S.<sup>3</sup>

#### Flexible

In addition to speed and range, flexibility is one of the most important attributes that air forces bring to contingency operations. The aerospace environment is ideal for unlimited movement in three dimensions giving air forces inherent flexibility not available to surface forces.<sup>4</sup> Current technology has provided air forces capable of producing a wide range of precise combat effects under nearly all conditions of weather and time of day. Air refuelable transports, fighters, and bombers with advanced electronics and sensors have greatly increased the flexibility of U.S. airpower over the past decade. However, dependence on large fixed air bases to support the most responsive (land-based) element of U.S. airpower continues to hamper flexibility of deployed air forces operating in most Third World nations.

Short runways, reduced load bearing surfaces, limited ramp space, and near bare-base support capability are all more common than not in contingency operations. Fully operable air bases, then, should not be assumed--resulting in greatly constrained sortie generation as well as the numbers and types of aircraft available for employment in contingency operations.

Mobile

Contingency operations require air forces and surface forces to be made available in sufficient mass at the critical point and time desired by the joint task force commander. To keep planning and coordination simple, it is highly desirable that air forces remain as far forward as possible, consistent with availability of air bases and the threat. Air mobility of ground forces is especially crucial in unconventional operations where a commander must be capable of rapidly repositioning forces to defeat an enemy whose forces are not concentrated along conventional battle lines. Air forces are inherently mobile and able to concentrate firepower until surface forces can be repositioned for sustained combat operations. However, air forces need to maintain a high level of presence during the initial insertion of ground combatants and should be capable of keeping air lines of communication open until surface resupply is achieved. For this reason, forward operating bases and suitable aircraft with adequate endurance can prove crucial to contingencies that require air support for ground operations.

Appropriate

Contingency operations are usually time-sensitive and require rapid application of military capabilities in situations where political

or economic efforts would prove too slow or incapable of achieving desired objectives. Current, complete, and accurate information on the nature of the threat and operating environment is critical to successful mission accomplishment. Planners need direct access to all-source intelligence to ensure the forces chosen are adequate to attain the specific objective envisioned by the NCA. Direct observation by intelligence operatives may require clandestine insertion into the objective area by air. On the other hand, indirect observation to obtain near real-time information will frequently rely on aerial platforms (e.g., Joint STARS). In addition, the composition of the military force will need to satisfy political constraints levied by the NCA as well as integrate with host nation capabilities. Therefore, the proper selection of forces is highly dependent on complete understanding of national objectives being supported, political situation in the region, and specific operating and threat environment.<sup>5</sup>

The selection of appropriate forces also depends on the type operation being conducted. Contingency operations typically fall into one of the following categories:

- crisis intelligence operations
- humanitarian assistance
- noncombatant evacuation
- security assistance surges
- shows of force and demonstration
- raids and attacks
- rescue and recovery operations
- support to U.S. civilian authorities<sup>6</sup>

In these contingency operations, the political, economic, and psychosocial considerations frequently overshadow strictly military objectives. For example, support for U.S. civil authorities to interdict

illicit drug trafficking must be balanced against what is publicly acceptable use of military force to capture or deter drug traffickers. Even security assistance surges must consider the psychosocial effect of introducing new military weapons on the people that are being supported as well as the desires of their leadership. Therefore, the commander's selection of forces must be appropriate for integration within diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial activities planned as part of a total national policy framework supporting U.S. interests in the region.

Sustainable

The time-compressed planning and typically austere operating environments of contingency operations make logistic considerations paramount to success of virtually all contingency operations. Logistic support must provide the minimum essential equipment and personnel needed for the planned duration of the operation and should begin immediately following initial deployment of U.S. forces. Very manpower-intensive maintenance and other logistic functions will normally be accomplished by rotating aircraft and other combat equipment through existing U.S. support facilities nearest to the contingency operating area. Forward resupply will normally be provided by means of air transportation until surface lines of communication are available. Intermediate staging bases adjacent to the objective area are generally desirable since this can reduce the logistic overhead within the objective area while shortening lines of communication for resupply. Forward basing within the objective area, on the other hand, can create even more substantial logistic support problems and require additional time to establish facilities and to provide adequate security. Ideally, units should deploy with

essential supplies to last the entire length of the planned operation; but uncertainty associated with any combat operation may preclude total dependency on unit supplies. Therefore, emergency resupply must always be considered an essential part of any contingency plan. Without pre-positioned ships or other readily accessible sources of supply within the objective area, airlift will likely be the primary means of emergency resupply for combat operations of less than 30-days duration.<sup>7</sup>

Controllable

NCA direct participation on both the planning and execution of contingency operations has proven commonplace. This is partly due to the availability of technical means for direct communications. However, it also largely results from the high political risks involved in any decision to use military forces short of declared war. Very specific results that ensure minimal collateral damage are needed if the use of force is to be a viable option. To minimize the risk of failure, very restrictive parameters, to include approval at the highest levels, may have to be built into crucial phases of the contingency plan. As a result, direct and secure communications to all echelons of command must be made available on a near continuous basis. Furthermore, air force elements involved in execution of the plan must also have direct access to all designated controlling authorities responsible for the success of the mission.

To achieve specific results with limited collateral damage, very precise navigation and highly accurate delivery systems are needed. This will frequently require employment of the most technologically sophisticated aerial platforms, further taxing logistic support

requirements for any extended operations. Enhancement of terrestrial forces through effective application of space capabilities, such as global navigation and target area illumination systems, could greatly contribute to the requirement for precision in austere operating environments while reducing the size and complexity of logistic support systems needed.

Conclusive

Sending the right signal to an adversary is an important aspect of any contingency operation. The Clausewitzean view that war is only an extension of politics is even more apparent in this type of highly politicized military operation. However, only rarely will the employment of military forces, by themselves, result in the totally conclusive results desired. Nevertheless, once employed, they must provide the measured contribution to U.S. interests expected by the NCA. Minor military failures can lead to extensive political failures of national policy with long-term implications for U.S. interests around the globe.

Failure is never hoped for but is a very real possibility in any contingency operation and should be addressed. For this reason, planning must include providing capability for rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces, thereby minimizing the likelihood of catastrophic failure. One has only to look to the Pueblo crisis, the bombing of Marine barracks in Lebanon, or the downing of the U-2 over Russia to envision the consequences of military failure in relationship to U.S. policy goals. The failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission or the abortive raid on Son Tay would have been even more catastrophic if U.S. forces had been unable to rapidly withdraw. Also, there is always the possibility that higher

priority missions may require redeployment to another theater of operations. Airpower will continue to be the primary means of rapidly concluding an operation by redeploying U.S. forces when directed by the NCA. Air forces must retain sufficient capability to ensure contingency operations can be concluded rapidly and on terms most favorable to the political environment in which the operation is being conducted.

## CHAPTER IV

### AIR CAMPAIGN PLANNING

Using the threat of force or the actual employment of military force to influence international situations short of declared war provides unique challenges to military planners. To be successful, an air campaign plan must be based on a complete **assessment** of the crisis at hand, a stream-lined **task force organization**, a properly tailored **force composition**, and a simple **concept of operations** that integrates air forces within an overall joint, combined, or interagency effort.

#### Assessment

A clear understanding of political objectives is essential to planning an air campaign. Once the overriding political objective is determined, more specific military courses of action can be evaluated to determine reasonably attainable military contributions to an overall national strategy for achieving those objectives. Military courses of action must then be weighed against potential risks of failure. The **nature of the threat, operating environment, and logistic considerations** are all major determinants of the success and level of risk associated with a contingency operation. All of these factors must also be considered in light of dynamically interactive and changing world events that may become further accentuated by the crisis at hand. For these reasons, assumptions about friendly nation support and opposing force posture must be clearly delineated for review by decision makers.

### Nature of the Threat

The concept of operations should be broad enough to consider anything that might prevent successful military contributions to national policy objectives. This could require a complete intelligence preparation of the battlefield for a major strike or, in the case of disaster relief, insuring U.S. aid is properly distributed to those in need. While the later case may seem unimportant in military terms, it can be very important in a political context. For example, the decision not to send assistance to Nicaragua following the worst hurricane to hit it in this century sent an undeniable signal to the Sandinista government on the importance of having good relations with its neighbors. Similarly, the disaster relief sent to earthquake-damaged Soviet Armenia signaled a change in attitude in U.S.-Soviet relations that could have an enduring effect on future relations. While the occurrence of disasters is obviously not controllable, the manner in which the military overcomes adversity in providing timely assistance can have a long-term political impact on international relations.

In those situations where use of military forces are likely to be opposed, command of the air must be an air campaign planners first consideration. As a minimum, local air superiority is essential in the objective area or along air lines of communication. For sustained air operations, air base vulnerability to surface attack by indigenous forces must also be determined. This analysis requires specific information on the opposing force order of battle, to include current location and capabilities. It may require redirection of overhead national technical means of strategic reconnaissance as well as clandestine infiltration and

exfiltration of intelligence operatives. Every effort must be made to reduce uncertainty while ensuring strategic and tactical surprise for the selected course of action. For this reason, operational security must remain an integral part of both the planning and execution phase of the air campaign. Deception and psychological operations should also be included early in the campaign planning effort to further minimize the likelihood of failure while increasing the military contribution to the overall political objective.

Once the nature of the threat is fully understood, public information programs must be integrated into the overall operation wherever and whenever possible without compromising operational security. Since contingency operations do not follow from declarations of war, complete public support for military operations is rarely assured prior to initiation. Therefore, making available timely and accurate information for the public is an important consideration. Use of the designated media pool to cover certain key events and advance selection of appropriate types of information and times for release during the operation can increase the likelihood of positive international as well as domestic support for the operation. Ultimately, however, success of the operation will be the prime determinant in continued public support and unnecessary releases that compromise that success should be prevented whenever possible. Media use of commercial satellite imagery and other means to scoop the story must also be considered in developing an effective operational security plan.

### Operating Environment

Availability of support facilities and interoperability with host nation air forces should be considered along with climate, terrain, and demographic factors. Normally, contingency plans will only address availability of existing facilities to support operations--keeping in mind that most operations are of very short duration and, if successful, are expected to terminate as quickly as they are initiated. However, it is not uncommon for contingencies to extend indefinitely for political reasons. For example, the Marine amphibious brigade deployment to Beirut was initially designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve, but the Marines were not put to any specific use other than to be in position and ready for action. This resulted in their being garrisoned over an extended period in less than optimal facilities within a hostile environment.

Air force deployments to foreign air bases are extremely vulnerable to attacks similar to the terrorist bombing of the Marine garrison. Crowded parking ramps without revetments and high sortie rate demands on limited air resources can be expected to increase air force vulnerability to attack from both the air and the ground. Even where dispersal of aircraft to several bases is possible, operational planning and logistic support problems increase geometrically with the number of dispersal bases. Also, range and time-on-station requirements for most TACAIR resources will normally make forward deployment necessary, increasing the requirement of aerial resupply and likelihood of crowded operating conditions. Even without a significant external threat, a single mishap involving ordinance handling or refueling can have catastrophic results--as occurred in the 1965 ordinance explosion on the

crowded ramp at Bien Hoa<sup>1</sup> or the 1979 refueling operation at Desert One in Iran.<sup>2</sup>

For these reasons, aircraft with adequate range and endurance should limit their time on the ground at forward bases. For example, airlift aircraft generally require large ramp areas and significant fuel uploads; and every effort should be made to use inflight refueling or stage them through adjacent airfields (preferably on the outbound leg) to enable them to perform engine running offloads--providing maximum through-put with minimal impact on forward air base operations.

Similarly, AWACS, tanker aircraft, and other longer range air assets, such as intelligence, command and control, and electronic warfare aircraft, should be operated from less vulnerable and crowded bases whenever possible.

Employment of carrier-based airpower can greatly reduce dependence on potentially vulnerable land basing modes of operations. Nevertheless, tanker, AWACS, and airlift support will continue to play a major role in sustained operations in most Third World regions, as has been seen in U.S. protection for re-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Accessibility to friendly countries' air bases and localized air superiority through interoperability with TACAIR provided by those nations has been a major factor in the success of this predominantly maritime mission. In addition, projection of naval TACAIR beyond approximately 400 nautical mile combat radius can require additional land-based tanker support. Careful analyses are also needed to ensure carrier battle group defenses are not compromised by proximity to hostile, land-based airpower.

Operating in sovereign airspace of another country and working within the framework of another country's air forces can also provide real limitations to desired operational flexibility. In the early U.S. involvement in Vietnam, for example, the military was restricted from using jet aircraft in combat to comply with 1954 Geneva Accords even though the U.S. was not a signatory of the accords.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, anytime U.S. military forces are used in contingencies short of declared war, other restrictions are likely to be invoked to comply with international law and to minimize the likelihood of capture as well as to protect the status of U.S. forces that are captured. In this regard, complete and accurate information on climate, terrain, and demography can also be just as important to rescue and recovery operations as they are to selection of targets and air assets for accomplishment of the primary objective. For this reason, requests for Defense Mapping Agency and Air Force Global Weather Central support should be initiated as soon as the objective area is known to ensure accurate planning and execution data are available. Poor map coverage for Grenada during "Urgent Fury" and unexpected dust storms during the abortive Iran hostage rescue underscore the need to get these two agencies on board as early as possible.

Finally, communications connectivity within the U.S. command structure as well as interoperability with host nation capabilities must be considered. Early decisions on the use of wartime reserve modes and selection of operational security codes will help to insure their availability and operational status. While fleet satellite communications capabilities are excellent, plans which rely heavily on maritime-based forces must consider that continuous two-way communication

is not consistent with naval doctrine requiring extensive communications discipline to prevent detection. Peacetime demands on limited satellite communication channels and poor coverage of many Third World regions may further restrict effective control of contingency forces. Within the objective area, connectivity between air and ground forces is always important to provide for immediate air support. Also, in those operations which provide direct support to another country, communications with host nation military forces must be planned. For example, U.S. air strikes within Vietnam had to be approved by the local province chief, who was both the political and military leader.<sup>4</sup> Finally, it is important to recognize that communicating in contingency operations often transcends merely providing good technical means of communication; it frequently will involve having a thorough knowledge of the people and their psychosocial and political environment.

#### Logistic Considerations

The type of operation contemplated, location, and duration can make logistical considerations the most difficult obstacle to overcome. Achieving closure of the deployed force, medical and noncombatant evacuation operations, sustainment, combat mobility, and redeployment should be thoroughly scrutinized in any courses of action under serious consideration. Strategic, theater, and organic air mobility resources are the primary contributions of airpower to this aspect of contingency operations.

Deployment of surface and air forces with their organic equipment and supplies in proper sequence and in appropriate concentration is no easy task. If one of the afloat marine amphibious brigades is the right

type of force needed and if they happen to be located in close proximity to the crisis area, many of these logistic problems can be minimized. However, if Marines must be airlifted to marry up with one of their maritime pre-positioned ships, adjacent airfield and port facilities will be needed. Any other type of deployment involving ground forces will have to rely extensively on strategic mobility unless operations are conducted in areas immediately adjacent to U.S. borders. Selection of marshalling points and aerial ports of embarkation will not only become crucial to achieving desired closure rates but also may impact upon operational security needed to achieve surprise. This makes staging operations on the way into an objective usually undesirable; also aerial refueling in lieu of enroute stops is generally preferred unless remarshalling of forces is absolutely necessary. Finally, planners need to be aware that unit type codes and force modules developed under the Joint Operational Planning System are oriented toward commitments for high intensity conflicts in Europe and the Far East. Much of the combat support and combat service support needed for these units are found in separate corps level organizations or within reserve components not generally available for contingencies. Additional time could be needed to specifically tailor these force modules and enter them into the Joint Deployment System run by USTRANSCOM.

Since the U.S. is a global economic power, it is not surprising that American citizens can be found in virtually every country in the world. Almost every contingency operation must consider either medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in some form or fashion. In the "Urgent Fury" operation in Grenada, NEO was a

primary objective. Rapid evacuation of combat casualties was also a major consideration. Normally, returning organic, theater, and strategic airlift capability can be used. However, the air campaign plan should, as a minimum, identify appropriate rear area staging points for transfer to predesignated aircraft that are reconfigured and crewed for MEDEVAC or maximum passenger capability.

Establishment of air lines of communication to supplement host nation support capability must be considered for all deployed force operations and is an absolute necessity when the length of stay will exceed organic unit supply capability. In fact, in the "Nickel Grass" operation that supported Israel during the 1973 War, providing aerial resupply of warfighting equipment to replace combat losses was the primary objective. In any combat operation, the consumption of fuels, munitions, and operating stocks must be calculated, and planning should identify sources and methods of delivery. For deployed air forces, plans should determine adequacy of storage facilities and capabilities for upgrading or returning air base facilities to acceptable sortie generation capability following battle damage. In operations in direct support of another nation, a corollary objective may also be to leave behind greatly improved facilities for use by the host nation.

Finally, creation of ideal conditions for terminating U.S. military force activities in a contingency is an inherent objective in any well-developed plan. Exfiltration of clandestine units and redeployment of overt military forces, however, may not occur under ideal circumstances. Getting out quickly can greatly reduce both the political and military cost of failure. Even in ideal conditions, an orderly

redeployment which minimizes impact on the host nation and reduces rear area vulnerability is preferred. Therefore, a contingency campaign plan should also provide an initial assessment of redeployment requirements and be reviewed and updated throughout the employment phase for possible execution with minimal notice.

#### Task Force Organization

The nature of the overall objective and the specific mission assigned to the military should provide the primary basis for organizing the task force. In the past, however, greater emphasis appears to have been placed on whose area of responsibility the crisis took place and on which Service provided the preponderance of capability when determining the task force organization. With four functionally organized combatant commands (USTRANSCOM; USSOCOM; USSPACECOM; SAC) and with the remainder of the unified combatant commands assigned specific regional areas of responsibility which do not encompass much of the Third World, deciding which will be in charge and how best to organize a task force can be a major problem. In addition, consideration should be given to integrating the military effort into the U.S. political and economic framework that already exists. The organization must also provide for the degree of controllability necessary to respond rapidly to changes in NCA guidance, while maintaining flexibility to adapt to the host country operating environment. Finally, the doctrinal imperative of centralized control and decentralized execution remains just as valid for contingency operations as it is for much larger conventional operations.

Chain of Command

Selection of who is to be in charge should generally be based upon the specific military capability desired to achieve the objective. Hostage rescue operations are very delicate and require precise, low-visibility operations found in special operations forces. Disaster relief and noncombatant evacuation generally require full appreciation for airlift capabilities in crowded or austere operating locations. Air strikes require expertise in organizing strike packages to penetrate hostile airspace and in selecting appropriate ground targets. When invasions are contemplated, surface combatants are likely to command the task force and will rely on a functional air component commander or individual Service component command structure to conduct the air effort.

Once chosen, the task force commander must be assured simple and clear lines of communication to the NCA. Normally, the commander will retain operational control of all assigned forces and report (be accountable) to the NCA through a single commander in chief (CINC) of one of the specified or unified combatant commands. After the task force commander's concept of operations and implementing campaign plan is approved, the supported CINC should coordinate all supporting activities to provide the resources needed by the task force commander. Every effort should be made to allow for innovation and flexibility in operations by the task force commander, recognizing that NCA guidance may have already significantly constrained the number and types of forces to be used.

When organizing the task force staff, consideration should be given to the frequency and detail of reporting required. Appointment of

a deputy commander to be in charge during the principal's absence will likely prove very important due to the high political visibility and likely media attention focused on task force activities. Furthermore, proper staffing to provide timely and accurate situation reporting can prevent the commander from becoming overwhelmed by information requests from higher headquarters.

Unity of Effort

Recognition that most military activities will need to be integrated into a U.S. country team is important. Security assistance surges, for example, should be handled within the existing security assistance network of the host country. In noncombatant evacuation operations, the State Department can be expected to be closely involved in both the planning and execution phases. Covert or clandestine operations, on the other hand, will often involve the National Security Agency or Central Intelligence Agency and could require use of unconventional forces and tactics. Access to information on these highly sensitive special activities is necessary to prevent fragmentation of effort or conflicting purposes. Finally, other activities such as drug enforcement are likely to involve other organizations, such as the Department of Commerce, United States Information Agency, Department of Transportation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and United States Coast Guard.

Regardless of the situation, however, it is appropriate to identify a single on-scene commander or other U.S. officer such as the ambassador or task force commander who is placed in charge and is fully informed on all U.S. activities supporting U.S. strategy within a

designated geographic area of responsibility. The authority to employ military forces must continue to rest with the supported CINC who retains operational command, however, final approval for determining what level of force and where it can be properly employed may rest with a U.S. civil authority who retains on-scene responsibility for achieving U.S. objectives. In such cases the task force commander should be assigned as the primary military advisor to insure selected military courses of action are congruent with training and equipage of the deployed task force. Subsequent approval through the CINC and Joint Chiefs of Staff by the NCA may be necessary if a planned operation exceeds deployed capabilities or changes the overall scope of previously approved courses of action. However, the task force should retain sufficient operational flexibility to adapt to unplanned conditions as long as force employment plans remain in harmony with the strategic objectives set by the NCA.

#### Force Composition

Economy of force, mass, and firepower principles of warfare may require extensive adaptation in contingency operations. Minimum use of force, minimum casualties, and minimum collateral damage are likely corollary objectives to be met by military forces. Therefore, weapon selection, targeting, and general rules of engagement may require significant alteration to satisfy political constraints--frequently resulting in less than optimum force packages to achieve tactical objectives. Self sustaining, highly accurate, responsive, low-visibility military forces are usually preferred unless a show of force, demonstration of resolve, or significant U.S. presence are desired. Also, in most Third World security environments highly reliable, low-

technology equipment is usually preferred and may even be mandated as was the use of non-jet aircraft in Vietnam before 1965.

Finally, warfighting is more likely to be unconventional, requiring U.S. combat forces to be more adaptive and flexible in their employment. Ultimately, however, the specific mission assigned and the threat confronting the task force will determine its composition. For the air campaign planner those missions might best be characterized as: **mobility, command of the air, strategic attack, observation, interdiction, and close support.**

#### Mobility

Getting the force package to the objective area at the proper time and in the proper sequence is crucial to any contingency operation. For disaster relief and security assistance surges in benign environments, it may be the only major consideration. The type of cargo (bulk, outsize, or oversize), quantity (short tons), distance, and availability of adequate staging, onload, and offload locations are the major concerns in campaign planning. When military units are to be deployed, early decisions on the composition of the tailored task force can be crucial in providing the Joint Deployment Community and logistic sustainability planners with refined force module data for input into transportation feasibility estimators and resupply requirement models.

Once deployed, theater mobility will be required. Aerial lift requirements may include liaison, rescue, assault, resupply, infiltration, exfiltration, psychological operations, medical evacuation, as well as command and control. Operating conditions, general threat

environment, and range and endurance requirements will usually dictate whether helicopter or fixed wing aircraft will be more useful.

Command of the Air

Local air superiority is an overriding concern in most contingency operations. However, contingency operations to be conducted in a benign environment or to be completed without detection by hostile force will not usually require command of the air. In almost all other situations, suppression of enemy air defenses, offensive counter air, and defensive counter air should be addressed in the air campaign plan. Both electronic and signal intelligence as well as electronic warfare capability should be contemplated in developing plans which desire to eliminate threats with minimum use of destructive force. Rapid communications and interrogation capabilities will also be needed to distinguish between friendly and hostile forces. The enemy threat, length of stay in an area, and desired degree of freedom from air attack will largely determine the size and composition of air superiority forces. Limited or austere air basing conditions can result in the requirement for maritime air or extensive tanker support for air operations from more distant air bases. Short or vertical take-off and landing capable aircraft may allow dispersed modes of operation, but logistic support arrangements to provide POL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), munitions, and spare parts will severely limit sortie generation capability in such alternate basing modes of operations.

### Strategic Attack

Aerial mine laying, bombing, and very short duration deployments of surface forces comprise this type of contingency operation. It will generally involve forces which operate from existing U.S. controlled facilities and which are designed to deliver a single destructive blow to an enemy or to deny an enemy continued access to an area. The timing, tempo, and target selection should be closely controlled to achieve maximum desired effect. This mission is ideally suited for the rapid speed, effective range, and flexibility of modern air forces. Military reprisals, hostage rescue, and direct military support for indigenous forces are likely scenarios requiring this mission capability. Its success depends on highly accurate and timely intelligence, secure and effective command, control, and communications systems, detailed mission planning, and rehearsal by units selected to execute the plan. Surface units should plan to deploy with all essential equipment to conclude their operation without resupply.

### Observation

This is a historic mission for air forces. It includes strategic and tactical aerial reconnaissance both before and after military operations, and it may also include aerial illumination of an area to deny an enemy the sanctuary of darkness. The use of national technical means of reconnaissance may prove adequate and is certainly less risky; however, on-scene observation of an objective area is crucial to the success of most direct military actions such as airborne assaults or amphibious landings. Infiltration and exfiltration of intelligence gathering teams by air is highly desirable because it can reduce the

likelihood of detection and can provide timely information. Where loss of life or capture is a major concern, remotely piloted vehicles may prove a useful alternative for tactical reconnaissance of targeting information.

#### Interdiction

Attacks designed to destroy, delay, or disrupt the movement of enemy troops or their lines of communication comprise this primary mission area. Air forces can conduct this type of operation with air-to-surface attacks or by airdropping ground forces to carry out the attack. Providing secure air bases and sustaining deployed force operations a major considerations in planning these operations. Target selection, civil-military command arrangements, and a host of special rules of engagement historically have made this type of mission more difficult to conduct. Division of the air effort among numerous competing requirements and unclear command and control arrangements should be avoided when planning interdiction campaigns.

#### Close Support

Close support of surface combatants is unique in that it requires closer communication between air and surface units to prevent collateral damage to friendly troops. In unconventional warfare, this separation becomes even more difficult to achieve. For example, identifying friendly military or paramilitary forces on search and destroy missions fighting in rural areas can be impossible without good communications and coordinate mapping systems. Of all the potential air missions, this is probably the most difficult to successfully plan and execute. Rapid response and lengthy on-station requirements often result in forward

deployment where logistic support is most difficult to achieve and air bases are most vulnerable to attack. Effective tactical command and control nets as well as highly accurate delivery systems that can drop ordinance day and night and stay on station for long periods of time are needed. Gunships or vertical takeoff and landing aircraft are ideally suited for these operations. Also, provided an adequate basing mode can be established, Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN)-equipped fighter aircraft can provide very discriminant firepower capability together with both day and night support for ground forces.

#### Concept of Operations

The commander's concept of operations must center on the specific task to be performed by the military in support of national policy objectives. However, the current crisis which brought about the need to employ military forces should not be the sole determinant in developing this concept. By its very nature, a crisis is an unplanned event which in some form or fashion challenges U.S. interests. It is important for the commander to understand fully the implications of the events surrounding the crisis as they impact upon those national interests. Otherwise, the solutions may give the crisis a life of its own without regard for any long-term or strategic policy goals for the region as a whole. Further, before U.S. military forces are involved at any level of contingency operations short of declared war, it is essential that there be direct linkages between the selected course of action, U.S. interests, and U.S. national policy to ensure continued public support following the usual media hype and political maneuvering by opposition groups. This

public support is absolutely crucial to sustaining the necessary national resolve, not only to conclude the operation successfully but also to carry out the long-term policy goals being supported by the contingency response.

In any crisis there is also a high likelihood that introducing military forces may prove escalatory even though the objective is to contain the crisis or to de-escalate the conflict. For this reason alone, significant restraints may be imposed on the employment of force. As a minimum, every effort should be made to insure military activities are directed only toward those crucial targets or opposing force capabilities that clearly represent the centers of gravity essential to achieving U.S. objectives. Criteria for terminating military involvement should also be made part of the concept of operations. The concept should clearly detail what constitutes a successful conclusion or a point where the military objectives are no longer attainable. Given this general context, the contingency planner must: determine the **situation**, identify the specific military **mission**, set **priorities and sequence of events**, and specify **support requirements**.

#### Situation

Accessibility by air and threat to air and surface forces within the objective area are important factors in establishing both the feasibility and level of risk inherent in any specific courses of action under consideration. Highly accurate, all-source intelligence with near real-time collection and interpretation is needed to determine the appropriate mission and composition of military forces to be employed. Also, it is important to recognize that properly focused and prioritized

intelligence collection efforts are more likely to provide useful planning information than a shotgun approach that produces mountains of only partially useful information.

Knowledge of an adversary's order of battle and willingness to employ its forces is essential to development and selection of an appropriate course of action. In addition, information on the professional expertise and psychological makeup of both the host and adversary's political and military leadership will also help in determining the reliability of host support and probable intent of the opposition. Armed with this information, the contingency planner should identify key military actions which would have maximum psychological impact (toward achieving host group's goals or restraining opposition group's aspirations). Ideally, selected military actions will quickly drive the opposition group toward a logical culminating point, thereby resolving the dispute or at least allowing it to revert to non-belligerent means of solution. Finally, intelligence information should be adequate to reasonably validate assumptions regarding the nature of the conflict as well as any external factors likely to influence the outcome. These assumptions must be clearly delineated so that, when new information becomes available, it can be correlated against those assumptions to see if new windows of opportunity exist or planned courses of action have been foreclosed.

#### Mission

The mission statement must be clear, simple, and direct. It should stem from the specific policy objectives of the NCA and convey to all elements of the task force the commander's intent regarding the level

of force to be used, limitations on operational initiative, attainment of key objectives, and conditions for terminating operations. Discriminant use of military force is frequently essential to preventing escalation of the crisis and, ultimately, in bringing an end to belligerent acts by the parties involved. Blockades and mining operations, for example, have the advantage of leaving the decision of violent confrontation to the opposition whose access to an area is being denied. Employment of non-lethal electronic warfare capability may prove an ideal alternative by rendering an adversary powerless without direct confrontation. Direct strikes, on the other hand, place U.S. forces in the role of a belligerent, and there is a danger of collateral (unintended) damage leading to reprisals and escalation of conflict.

For the air campaign plan, virtually all missions are likely to require some level of air control which can be achieved either defensively or offensively. Defensive counter air is usually preferred in that it also leaves the choice up to the opposing forces whether or not to engage in combat with U.S. forces. In cases where complete air superiority is mandated or where long-term elimination of airborne threats to friendly forces are desired, the surprise attack to neutralize enemy air forces on the ground has proven (e.g., Arab-Israeli wars) to be the best way to achieve it. Control of the air also implies a need for centralized management of friendly air forces which will require centralized deconfliction of air tasking orders and a system for command and control of airborne aircraft.

Aerial mobility and observation are not belligerent acts by themselves and are unlikely to cause collateral damage or unintended

results. For this reason, one or both of these missions are very likely to be incorporated into contingency operations in some form or another. Tanker support for air operations, airlift of troops and equipment, collection of target information, and battle damage assessment are all possible missions that fall within these two categories. Where direct observation is essential, special operations forces may be required to infiltrate and exfiltrate without detection. Each of these types of missions can demonstrate U.S. willingness to commit forces by providing a higher level of presence within a region that may deter an adversary from conducting further belligerent acts. However, placing U.S. forces in a hostile area with inadequate self protection capability and with no specific combat mission can prove counterproductive with calamitous results as were seen in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut.

Given the likelihood of these missions being employed in some form in virtually every contingency operation, all initial planning cells designated to develop the air campaign plan should logically include liaison officers with appropriate expertise in air superiority, tactical air control, aerial refueling, airlift (strategic, theater, and special operations), and reconnaissance planning. Other mission expertise, such as strategic bombing, close air support, and air interdiction, should also be included once it is determined that any of the courses of action under consideration would involve these other air missions.

#### Priorities and Sequence of Events

As previously mentioned, unity of effort mandates integration of the concept of operations with activities of other Services, departmental agencies, and host country indigenous capability. Early assembly of key

subordinate commanders and country team representatives for a thorough briefing is an effective method of communicating both the commander's intent as well as establishing priorities and identifying critical path events which must be accomplished to ensure mission success. For the air campaign, a single air control center (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), Airlift Control Center (ALCC), Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), etc.) should be established and empowered with command and control of the overall air effort--to redirect sorties as necessary, to achieve the commander's priorities, and to adjust for last minute changes. A designated principal control center, usually the TACC when established, should conduct centralized planning for the air commander. This planning is crucial to maintaining operational flexibility for changing the timing and tempo of air operations, thereby enabling the air commander to employ friendly forces well inside the opposing force's planning-decision-execution capability. Area air defense and other air control centers should directly coordinate their activities with the principal control center which can then incorporate all activities in a single master air tasking order to ensure the entire air effort is integrated for deconfliction, mutual support, and efficient airspace management. Finally, when setting priorities and scheduling air force activities, care must be taken to prevent division of air assets for control by individual field units. Central control enables air forces to retain their tremendous reserve capacity to redirect the air effort and take full advantage of their mobility, speed, and inherent flexibility--which can most effectively be employed as a single entity.

### Support Requirements

Sustainability, air base operability and defense, rescue and recovery, and C<sup>3</sup> requirements are key support requirements that need to be thoroughly addressed in the campaign plan. In joint operations, competition for transportation, very limited search and rescue capability, and access to finite secure communications nets have led to the development of resource allocation systems controlled by joint centers, such as a Joint Movement Center (JMC) or Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC), and specialized elements, such as the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). Integration of the military mission with other U.S. agencies can be extremely difficult without an adequate communication network that connects the task force commander with those other organizations. For example, the JCSE signal center, when deployed on a single specially modified C-130 JACKPOT aircraft, can network to provide access to facsimile, weather forecasting, secure communications centers, Service components, American embassies, and local area nets.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, a centralized operations center can prove invaluable in sorting out all the guidance and information being received and in retransmitting it to other elements of the task force. It should be the hub for intelligence gathering and analysis, target selection, and air apportionment recommendations. It can also play an important role in providing frequent and accurate situation reports (SITREP) to insure the NCA and supporting CINCs are aware of task force progress and requirements. Ultimately, it should provide the essential synchronization of the entire task force effort to ensure the commanders

**intent and strategic direction are carried out in consonance with other  
U.S. agencies and host nation forces.**

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The global leadership role accepted by the United States following world War II has required frequent use of its military instrument of national power to assist friendly nations and protect access to resources and markets. As more regional powers emerge and as more sources of high technology weapons become available from countries other than the two superpowers, the likelihood of armed struggles and other belligerent acts directly threatening U.S. interests can only increase over time. In an era of perestroika and glasnost within the U.S.S.R. and continued detente between Second and First World nations, the indirect challenge to contain communism will likely prove to be less significant over the next decade than it has in the past. Despite this general reduction in East-West tensions, the U.S. interest in free access to resources and markets is likely to be threatened by North-South issues involving the post colonial legitimacy of Third World governments. These direct challenges to world trade and the stability of friendly governments, together with natural disasters that most Third World countries are ill-equipped to deal with, can be expected to provide the primary stimuli for use of military capabilities as the Bush Administration's strategy unfolds over the coming decade.

The "massive retaliation" strategy of Secretary John Foster Dulles in the 1950's threatened the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against guerrillas in local wars and proved completely bankrupt as a credible deterrent of international crises.<sup>1</sup> The flexible response

strategy of the 1960's was certainly more realistic but led to domestic policy dilemmas when employing military force short of declared war (e.g. draft deferrals and failure to fully employ guard and reserve forces in Vietnam War). Throughout the 1970's and early rearmament period of the 1980's the focus remained predominantly on developing a conventional capability to deter Soviet aggression against other nations with which the U.S. had formal treaty commitments. AirLand Battle Doctrine and Maritime Strategy focused military organization and force structure goals on developing rational, war-winning capabilities. After all, these were the wars the U.S. could not afford to lose and credible U.S. commitment was vital to prevent the U.S.S.R. from imposing its will on U.S. allies by its sheer massive conventional capability.

Under the Reagan Administration, due in part to some perceived failings by the Carter Administration as well as failings and several important successes during the Reagan Administration, the U.S. began to focus on how to best deal with localized hostilities requiring use of military force. Reacting to these administrations' handling of the Iranian hostage rescue mission and the Grenada operation, Congress passed a bill, which became the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, and an amendment to a spending bill, which created a unified combatant command for special operations. Both of these measures reflected great concern by Congress over U.S. inability to employ forces to deal effectively with localized threats to national interests. More recently, the Reagan Administration was confronted with policy dilemmas in Central America for which use of force without a direct confrontation "vital to U.S. interest" proved difficult to achieve. For example,

despite a popular mandate to stop the flow of drugs into the U.S. and to eradicate the illicit narcotics activities, President Reagan proved powerless in dealing with Noriega in Panama. As a result, it appears very unlikely that President Bush will be able to fulfill his emphatic inaugural promise to conclude the war on drugs during his administration without much greater military involvement.

If the Bush Administration is to be successful in this endeavor as well as improve upon past failings that has led to very reactive legislation by Congress over the past few years, they will need to develop a more coherent national strategy that will ensure the military instrument is appropriately used along with non-military instruments of policy. Carl Von Clausewitz best stated this in On War when he wrote:

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.<sup>2</sup>

Recognizing the need to be capable of employing forces in highly politicized contexts, air forces are ideally suited for use in almost every situation. Their speed, range, and inherent flexibility lend themselves readily to contingency situations where rapid response and discriminant use of force are paramount in achieving political objectives. Provided air base operability and survivability are adequately addressed, air forces can sustain much longer term operations needed for air superiority and close support of surface forces. They can also provide indirect or direct observation through various aerial reconnaissance platforms as well as clandestine air infiltration and exfiltration support. Furthermore, proper force packaging, based on

hard, all-source intelligence, can make air forces highly survivable when conducting missions over enemy territory--thereby reducing the likelihood of airmen being captured, missed, or killed in action only to become instruments of coercion against U.S. policy. Finally, air forces are generally well equipped for centralized command and control of their own operations, and they can often extend that capability to surface units through airborne C<sup>3</sup> platforms. This enables appropriate decision makers at all levels to rapidly conclude or recall military forces--a capability which is crucial to minimizing the impact of a mission's failure or which can prevent high risk operations from continuing when other events diminish the political value of completing a mission.

The air commander's campaign plan should make effective use of airpower to achieve the NCA objective while integrating air forces into the joint campaign plan. Initially, the plan should focus air force capabilities on providing observation of the enemy threat and operating environment needed for course-of-action and concept development. Subsequently, it should concentrate on acquiring near real-time intelligence for operational and tactical decision-making during the course of the campaign. Logistic considerations which impact upon force closure, NEO and MEDEVAC, sustainment, local combat mobility, and redeployment are also crucial elements that need to be addressed in the campaign plan. Further, the plan should ensure the air effort is synchronized and properly integrated with all other military and non-military activities, including those of the host government. A well-constructed plan will also clearly identify restrictions on the use of force and will provide for direct access to decision-makers capable of

altering written guidance. To achieve unity of effort and synergism of all supporting activities, the plan should clearly define what constitutes success of the operation and communicate the commanders intent for employing forces to achieve the goals established by the NCA. Ideally, the plan will identify events and correlate them to military force capabilities that yield maximum psychological impact upon an adversary, either to deter them from further belligerent activities or to compel them to change a policy which is in conflict with U.S. interests. Therefore, the selected course of action on which the plan is based should logically drive toward a culminating point where the opposition would agree to settle the conflict of interests through diplomacy or other non-military recourse.

Throughout the military involvement in the campaign, the air commander's plan needs to make provisions for a means of escape and evasion in the event U.S. forces are overrun or airmen are downed behind enemy lines. It should ensure that all air forces are centrally managed so that they retain their ability to mass for concentration of firepower and to reemploy or withdraw surface combatants rapidly as the situation dictates. Whenever possible, the commander should look for avenues to employ electronic combat capabilities, deception, psychological warfare, or other non-lethal means to overwhelm the enemy and successfully conclude the contingency quickly. In selecting tactical objectives, care should be taken to ensure they do not provide a reason, in and of themselves, to extend or escalate the conflict. In other words, every consideration should be given to selecting targets and employing maximum

military coercion against the specific undesirable activities which challenge U.S. interests without broadening the scope of the conflict.

Finally, while campaign planning for contingency operations such as disaster relief or retaliation for state-sponsored terrorism will generally require rapid, short-term, and very precise military actions, other activities such as protection of Persian Gulf oil routes can involve lengthy operations which entail considerable logistic support for sustainment. These prolonged contingency operations are inherently risky due to imperfect intelligence and the friction and fog surrounding human unpredictability under extended stress of combat. The bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon and the shooting down of the Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf are typical examples. It is interesting to note that the former incident had the gravest political impact on the ability of the U.S. to continue to influence the Lebanese crisis, partly due to the high toll in American lives. More importantly, however, it occurred in a situation in which political goals for the region were not properly translated into military objectives, placing the Marines at risk without any readily apparent ability to make useful contributions to U.S. interests. The Persian Gulf incident, on the other hand, was regrettable but was concluded to be an unfortunate event surrounding U.S. support for a very necessary military involvement which provided assured access to a vital resource needed by industrialized Western nations.

The primary point to remember in contingency operations is the importance of maintaining a clear connection between our national strategy and any actual employment of military capabilities. In disaster relief operations, appropriate use of military assistance can improve

U.S. ability to influence regional affairs. Other military operations such as a show of force, direct support of civil authorities, or security assistance surges can be used to demonstrate national resolve and deter further belligerent activities. Also, noncombatant evacuation and rescue and recovery operations may become necessary to reduce or eliminate threats to American citizens involved in foreign countries. Finally, in certain situations, strikes and raids, unconventional warfare, or peacemaking operations may be the only means to communicate U.S. commitment or to persuade a belligerent group to change its policy.

As U.S. national policy-makers shift their focus from bipolar superpower competition to regionally centralized conflicts, our National Command Authorities are very likely to employ military instruments of power to achieve national objectives. In virtually every foreseeable operation, air forces are able to provide formidable capabilities that can be employed by themselves or jointly with surface forces to satisfy NCA requirements. Therefore, air commanders and campaign planners must be prepared to respond to these likely future challenges within very restrictive operating environments common to these "peacetime" contingencies.

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## GLOSSARY

AADC	area air defense commander
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
AFM	air force manual
AOR	area of responsibility
ALCC	airlift control center
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control Center
BDA	battle damage assessment
CAS	Crises Action System or close air support
CHOP	change of operational control
C <sup>3</sup>	command, control, and communications
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CLANDESTINE	activities in which the operation itself is concealed
COVERT	activities in which the true sponsor is concealed
COA	course of action
COMSEC	communications security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
EW	electronic warfare
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FM	field manual or force module

HNS host-nation support  
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield  
ISB intermediate staging base  
JACKPOT specially modified aircraft to provide power and antennas for JCSE communications equipment  
JDC joint deployment community  
JDS Joint Deployment System  
JFACC joint force air component commander  
JFUB joint facilities utilization board  
JMC joint movement center  
JOC joint operations center  
JOPS Joint Operational Planning System  
JRCC joint rescue coordination center  
Joint STARS joint surveillance target attack radar system  
JTB joint transportation board  
JTF Joint Task Force  
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff  
JCSE Joint Communication Support Element  
LANTIRN Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night  
MAC Military Airlift Command  
MEDEVAC medical evacuation  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NCA National Command Authorities  
NSA National Security Agency  
NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operations  
OPCOM operational command

OPCON	operational control
OPSEC	operations security
PAO	public affairs office
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POMCUS	pre-positioning of material configured to unit sets
PSYOP	psychological operations
RSTA	reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
ROE	rules of engagement
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAR	search and rescue
SATCOM	satellite communications
SITREP	situation report
SOF	special operations forces
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACAIR	tactical air
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACON	tactical control
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unit type code
WWMCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System